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Abstract
Barbara Walter’s application of reputation theory to self-determination move-
ments has advanced our understanding of why many separatist movements result
in armed conflict. Walter has shown that governments of multi-ethnic societies of-
ten respond to territorial disputes with violence to deter similar future demands
by other ethnic groups. When governments grant territorial accommodation to one
ethnic group, they encourage other ethnic groups to seek similar concessions. How-
ever, a number of recent empirical studies casts doubt on the validity of Walter’s
argument. We address recent challenges to the efficacy of reputation building in the
context of territorial conflicts by delineating the precise scope conditions of repu-
tation theory. First, we argue that only concessions granted after fighting should
trigger additional conflict onsets. Second, the demonstration effects should particu-
larly apply to groups with grievances against the state. We then test the observable
implications of our conditional argument for political power-sharing concessions.
Using a global sample of ethnic groups in 120 states between 1946 and 2013, we
find support for our arguments. Our theoretical framework enables us to identify
the conditions under which different types of governmental concessions are likely to
trigger future conflicts, and thus has important implications for conflict resolution.
Ethnic Dominoes
Introduction
In path-breaking work on self-determination movements, Walter (2006b, 2009b) explains
the violent nature of separatist conflicts by emphasizing the importance of reputation
building for governments of multi-ethnic societies. Governments’ concessions to the de-
mands of one ethnic group for autonomy in multi-ethnic societies can inspire other ethnic
groups to bring forward similar demands, and possibly trigger armed conflicts. Once one
ethnic domino falls, many more will follow (Hale, 2000).1 The past behavior of govern-
ments, in the form of granting territorial concessions to early challengers, signals weak
resolve and helps other groups to update their beliefs about the type of government they
face. Therefore, governments of multi-ethnic societies have strong incentives to invest in
reputation building. They are often willing to pay the costs of fighting early secessionist
challengers to deter other groups from making similar demands in the future. Russia’s
long-term reluctance to grant independence to the Chechnians in the North Caucasus
illustrates the logic of this argument.
Although reputation theory as applied to self-determination movements has advanced
our understanding of secessionist conflict, important questions remain pertaining to the
theory’s empirical validity and its applicability to broader range of government conces-
sions. First, a number of recent studies cast doubt on the role and consequences of
reputation building in the context of territorial conflicts (Nilsson, 2010; Forsberg, 2013;
Sambanis, Germann & Schädel, 2018). Second, territorial concessions constitute only one,
albeit important, form of accommodation governments offer to ethnic groups. Political
concessions, such as the inclusion of formerly excluded ethnic groups in the government
in the form of power-sharing, provide another viable alternative.2 Do political power-
sharing concessions exhibit reputational dynamics similar to territorial concessions as
1We use domino effects and demonstration effects interchangeably.
2The two type of concessions this study focuses on have been labeled in various ways. Political power-
sharing is variably known as central or governmental power-sharing, inclusion, or the grand coalition.
We use the term inclusion and power-sharing interchangeably to refer to formal and informal executive
coalitions that encompass de facto representatives of at least two ethnic groups. Similarly, territorial
concessions have been labeled ethnic federalism, regional autonomy, and territorial power-sharing. We
use the term territorial concessions and autonomy interchangeably to denote any arrangement that gives
leaders of one ethnic group meaningful levels of self-governance in a specific area.
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demonstrated by Walter (2009b)? Case study evidence from Africa’s Great Lakes region
suggests that granting power-sharing triggers similar detrimental domino effects as grant-
ing autonomy (Tull & Mehler, 2005). However, we do not have any systematic evidence
whether these domino effects extend beyond a few cases in Africa.
In this article, we address questions regarding to the empirical validity of reputation
theory in the context of territorial concessions by explicating the conditions under which
we should observe violent ethnic domino effects. First, we argue that only concessions
granted in response to violent challenges should inspire additional territorial armed con-
flicts. While concessions granted in peacetime may signal low governmental resolve, they
do not prove rebellion as an effective strategy. Second, we argue that not all ethnic
groups in a state respond equally to witnessing concessions. Only those groups with
existing grievances against the government would have incentives to rebel in reaction to
the accommodation of the demands of another ethnic group.
Our conditional argument explains some of the inconsistent empirical support for
Walter’s argument. Using a sample of politically relevant ethnic groups included in the
Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR) between 1946 and 2013 (Cederman, Wimmer &
Min, 2010; Vogt et al., 2015), we find that autonomy concessions are indeed associated
with additional territorial civil war onsets, in line with Walter (2006b, 2009b). However,
violent domino effects only occur if governments granted the concession to a violent
challenger. Territorial concessions granted during peaceful periods do not seem to trigger
additional rebellions. On the challenger side, our results indicate that only groups with
neither autonomy nor access to governmental power take up arms for greater self-rule
when other groups gain it after fighting. Therefore, we demonstrate that the support for
the reputation theory seems to be neither as broad as Walter assumes nor as weak as
Forsberg claims.
In addition to accounting for the inconsistent empirical support for reputation theory
in the context of territorial concessions, our conditional approach uncovers a similar con-
ditional dynamic for power-sharing concessions. Granting inclusion only triggers demon-
stration effects after wars and only by excluded groups. This is an important insight
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not only because power-sharing has emerged as one of the most common mechanisms
of conflict resolution since the end of the Cold War (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007: 54), but
also because more and more scholars agree on its effectiveness in preventing civil war
recurrence (Lijphart, 1977; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Mattes & Savun, 2009).
Our study thus contributes to a growing literature on conflict resolution and secession-
ist conflicts that extends Walter’s insights. Cunningham (2011), for example, studies the
strategic choices governments face when dealing with multiple factions within one self-
determination movement rather than between multiple independent challengers. Build-
ing more directly on reputation theory, Griffiths (2015) argues that the success of one
secessionist movement depends on the number of additional challengers with preexisting
administrative units rather than on the number of all challengers. We join these studies
by emphasizing a conditional approach to reputation theory but differ in two respects.
For one, similar to Walter (2006b) and Cunningham (2013a) we study the perspective
of potential challengers rather than governments. Second, we investigate armed conflict
rather than the success of self-determination movements as the most concerning outcome
of self-determination movements.
Reputation theory and territorial civil war
Reputation theory, first developed in economics, describes attempts of firms to keep
potential competitors out of the market. Fierce price competition, which deters market
entry by potential rivals, originally hurts already existing firms but shields them from
competition in the long run. Walter adopts this theory to explain self-determination
conflicts between a government and an ethnic minority over control of territory and argues
that governments often hesitate to settle territorial demands peacefully. The reason for
choosing violent confrontation over compromise lies in governments’ fears that settlement
will trigger domino effects. Governments prefer fighting to send potential challengers a
signal of high resolve, and thus deter future demands and armed conflict.
Although Walter is not the first scholar to examine government’s reputation with re-
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gard to territorial civil wars (for example, Toft, 2002, 2003), she develops and tests the
theory in the most systematic fashion. Walter (2009b: 13–15) identifies four conditions
under which reputation theory applies to the interactions between governments and eth-
nic minorities. First, reputation theory requires repeated play of government-minority
interactions and thus only operates when granting concessions to one ethnic group today
raises the possibility of future demands by other potential challengers. Second, issue
specificity necessitates that both the actions and the actors should be sufficiently similar
to one another, and that potential challengers should be able to observe the relevance of
concessions granted to another actor to their own situation. Third, observability means
that government behavior is visible and public to observing groups. Fourth, incomplete
information is an important precondition of reputation logic for two reasons. First, ini-
tial challenger hide their true fighting capability to attract outside funding or extract a
better deal from negotiations while the government will fight early challengers to distin-
guish strong from weak and bluffing rebels (Walter, 2009a: 247-249). Second, even after
witnessing concessions to other rebels, potential challengers do not know with certainty
if they are facing a resolved government that had to give in to a strong challenger or
an uncommitted incumbent with low resolve. Simultaneously, these ‘uncommitted gov-
ernments have strong incentives to behave as if they were tough, at least against early
challengers’ (ibid., 250).
With these scope conditions in place, the reputation argument proceeds in seven steps:
(1) the initial challenger demands a concession, (2) the government decides whether to
concede, (3) the initial challenger rebels or not, (4) the government responds by conceding
or not, (5) a potential challenger witnesses the preceding actions and demands a conces-
sion, (6) the government again decides how to respond, and (7) the potential challenger
rebels or acquiesces.3 Walter (2006a) finds that governments are less likely to concede
initially (steps 2 or 4) when they expect further demands later on. This result supports
the notion that governments act strategically and consider the implications of their ac-
tions in steps 5-7. Walter (2006b) also presents evidence in favor of reputation theory’s
3We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion to divide the reputation argument into
these seven steps.
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implications for ethnic groups, which are more likely to violently seek self-determination
(step 7) after witnessing concessions earlier (steps 2 or 4).4 Thus, some governments
either miscalculate or face other constraints which necessitate earlier concessions.5
Recent studies question the empirical validity of Walter’s conclusions (Nilsson, 2010;
Forsberg, 2013; Sambanis, Germann & Schädel, 2018). The most direct empirical chal-
lenge to the efficacy of reputation building comes from Forsberg (2013: 338), who shows
that ‘ethnic groups are not more predisposed to pursuing violent conflict when other
groups in the proximity are successful in the pursuit of their separatist demands.’ Like
Walter (2006b), Forsberg investigates the likelihood of violent challenges (step 7) but only
in the post-Cold War period. Unlike Walter, Forsberg’s analysis only considers conces-
sions granted in response to armed rebellion (step 4) rather than violent and non-violent
tactics (steps 2 or 4).6 Using a new dataset on secessionist demands, Sambanis, Germann
& Schädel (2018) fail to substantiate the validity of reputation theory with respect to
governments’ decision to accommodate or deny demands for self-determination in multi-
ethnic societies (step 2) and conclude that ‘governments may still care to set a precedent,
but only under a set of conditions that have not yet been specified’ (p.26).7
Do ethnic dominoes fall or don’t they? What explains these inconsistent findings?
Plausible answers include differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War period
on which Forsberg’s and Nilsson’s null findings depend and selection bias in the Minorities
at Risk (MAR) data used by Walter but not by her critics. Selection bias could affect the
type of concessions governments make as well as the recipients of these concessions and
mask heterogeneous treatments. For example, some concessions might be costlier than
others and the sample of ethnic groups in the MAR data may exhibit a higher propensity
to rebel than majority groups not at risk of discrimination (cf. Hug, 2013).
We argue that a more explicit recognition of the scope conditions of reputation theory
4Walter does not distinguish between concessions made in response to initial demands (step 2) and
those that occurred after an initial challenger rebelled (step 4).
5Walter (2006b) analyzes only armed responses to government concessions (step 7), while she jointly
investigates non-violent and violent responses (steps 5 or 7) in her 2009b book.
6Similarly, Nilsson (2010) finds no support for reputation theory in the context of negotiated settle-
ments in multi-party armed conflicts.
7Griffiths (2015) specifies the administrative architecture of states as one condition that affects gov-
ernments’ reactions to self-determination demands.
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helps explain why some authors, in particular Forsberg (2013), fail to substantiate Wal-
ter’s argument. We proceed by specifying the conditions under which we should expect
territorial concessions to trigger additional armed conflict by other ethnic groups. To
further evaluate the explanatory power of our conditional argument, we then examine
whether other forms of governmental concessions, such as power-sharing, exhibit similar
domino effects.8
Conditions of ethnic domino effects
Out of reputation theory’s four basic conditions, we argue that issue specificity is instru-
mental in predicting when armed conflicts erupt in response to witnessing government
concessions. Issue specificity necessitates that both the actions and the actors should be
sufficiently similar to one another. We contend that similarity in actions implies that only
concessions in response to armed conflict will trigger additional rebellions. Fighting an
internal armed conflict constitutes a high-risk undertaking with an uncertain outcome,
and endangers the lives of both rebels and civilians who live in conflict zones (Kalyvas &
Kocher, 2007). Rebelling requires not only the desire to obtain concessions but also the
promise of success to offset the costs of fighting. When the government validates such
beliefs, the imitation of a similar strategy is far more likely than when the government
turns down any violent challenge but rewards non-violent tactics.
Our argument specifically applies to violent demonstration effects and contrasts with
an alternative reading of reputation theory which emphasizes that governments fight early
challengers exactly to demonstrate that concessions require bearing the costs of fighting.
Giving away concessions to non-violent challengers ‘for free’ should thus encourage many
more demands for concessions, some of them violent, as the government reveals its low
resolve (Walter, 2009b: 27). Although governments may accommodate some challengers,
eventually even low resolve governments will not be willing to share ever more power and
8In this study, we are interested in violent domino effects, i.e., whether governmental concessions
encourage future rebellion, rather than non-violent tactics, by other ethnic groups. We explicitly describe
tactics and challengers as non-violent rather than peaceful because groups that do not fight might still
threaten violence.
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spoils, and decide to fight less deserving or weaker challengers. Existing research does not
distinguish between these two interpretations as Walter (2009b: 130) tests the combined
effect of territorial concessions extended to both non-violent and violent challengers.9
Our theoretical logic that emphasizes the similarity of actions by early and subse-
quent challengers is consistent with Chenoweth and Stephan’s theoretical explanation
for the generally higher success rate of non-violent movements relative to their violent
counterparts. Non-violent movements enjoy a ‘participation advantage’ over violent re-
bellions due to lower entry costs for individuals, and thus attract more followers who put
more pressure on the incumbent government (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 21). Only if
the government affirms that individuals have to pay the costs of violent conflict to gain
concessions will they engage in it.
Case evidence from India further supports our claim with regard to issue specificity. In
the 1950s, multiple largely peaceful movements for linguistic self-determination in India’s
Hindu mainland triggered additional demands for regional autonomy among linguistic
lines but no organized armed conflict. The Indian government under Nehru only conceded
to moderates that repudiated violence and thus strengthened those leaders who sought
change by non-violent tactics – a policy which indirectly deterred violence as successful
road to accommodation. In contrast, when Indira Gandhi started to negotiate with
extremist political actors in the late 1960s to weaken more moderate rivals in her own
Congress Party, violent movements for autonomy spread across several northeastern states
(Brass, 1991: 204-205). Arguing along similar lines, Wilkinson (2000: 789) quotes a Bodo
rebel leader explaining the choice for violence in 1989: The ‘central government agrees
to negotiate only with those groups that show their force. . . The signing of accords with
the Mizo National Front, the Tripura National Volunteers, and the Gorkha National
Liberation Front shows that New Delhi has approved the methods employed for their
objectives.’
H1 : Territorial concessions granted post-conflict to an ethnic group increase the risk
9Walter (2006b) and Forsberg (2013) both only test the consequences of concessions granted to violent
challenges.
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of civil war onsets by other ethnic groups.10
The issue specificity condition also applies to actors. It is unlikely that past con-
cessions have uniform effects on all ethnic groups in the society. The set of potential
challengers in a multi-ethnic society is more likely to include groups with grievances
against the government than groups satisfied with the status quo. Conflict researchers
have extensively documented the effect of grievances on the likelihood of civil war onset
(for example, Gurr, 2000; Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010). While Walter (2006b: 107-
108) explicitly outlines grievances as an alternative explanation to her reputation-based
argument, we focus on the interaction between the two hypotheses. In our argument,
grievances of potential challengers serve as a moderating variable between witnessing
concessions to one group and violent demonstration effects.
In the context of territorial concessions, aggrieved potential challengers lack both
territorial autonomy and they must be excluded from the central government. Our intu-
ition builds on Lacina’s insight that political power-sharing at the center increases ethnic
groups’ chances of realizing their preferences in the periphery (Lacina, 2014). Thus,
domino effects after territorial concessions to one group should be particularly applicable
to excluded and non-autonomous groups.
H2 : Territorial concessions granted post-conflict to an ethnic group increase the risk
of civil war onsets by other excluded and non-autonomous ethnic groups.
Whereas Walter (2006a,b, 2009b), Forsberg (2013), and others only consider auton-
omy concessions when studying reputation theory, governments extend other forms of
accommodation to opposition groups. Since the end of the Cold War, power-sharing
has become far more common than territorial concessions. Given its widespread use and
strong endorsement by the international community, it is important to have a systematic
understanding of potential perverse effects of power-sharing. The only empirical evidence
for the presence of domino effects of power-sharing comes from Tull & Mehler (2005)
who show that the extension of political power-sharing triggered additional rebellions in
Africa’s Great Lakes’ region.
10The reference group in all the hypotheses is no concessions.
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We do not have a strong theoretical reason to expect that the efficacy of reputa-
tion building should differ between territorial and power-sharing concessions. Gaining
inclusion into the government coalition constitutes a particularly valuable price in so-
called neopatrimonial states where clientelist practices dominate and holding governmen-
tal positions often constitutes the only possibility for elites to gain access to considerable
economic resources and redistribute them to their co-ethnics (Lemarchand, 1972; Bates,
1974; Evans, 1989). If power-sharing enables access to rents, such concessions should
have strong demonstration effects for other groups.
Moreover, the conditions of reputation theory developed with respect to territorial
concessions should similarly apply to power-sharing concessions. Governments of multi-
ethnic societies will likely engage in similar interactions with multiple groups sequentially
or simultaneously when negotiating government access and thus satisfy the repeated play
condition. With respect to the issue specificity and observability criteria, granting power-
sharing to one ethnic group is a specific enough policy that potential challengers would
like to claim for themselves and clearly constitutes a publicly observable event. Finally,
granting power-sharing concessions also fulfills the condition of incomplete information.
Once the government coalition changes, excluded groups do not possess complete infor-
mation over its intentions or strength, which fulfills a primary precondition of civil war
(Walter, 2009a: 250).
Yet, scholars such as Toft (2002) and Jarstad & Nilsson (2008) argue that govern-
ments generally care more about territorial integrity. Therefore, autonomy concessions
should be costlier than sharing power at the center, and matter more for governmental
reputation. If this perspective proved correct, power-sharing concessions would send a
noisy signal about government’s resolve to potential challengers and hence may not en-
courage additional rebellion as much as territorial concessions. Other conflict researchers,
however, emphasize costs such as ruling groups’ vulnerability to coups when inviting ri-
vals into the government (Roessler, 2011). On balance, it is unclear whether territorial or
power-sharing carries higher costs for the government. Thus, we argue that the type of
concessions should not have a systematically different effect on the efficacy of reputation
9
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building.
However, we once more stress that violent domino effects predominantly follow power-
sharing concessions under conditions similar to those we outlined above for autonomy
concessions. Reiterating our argument on the similarity of actions, potential challengers
need to know that rebellion pays. They are only more likely to resort to arms when
witnessing power-sharing as a conclusion to armed conflict. Regarding the similarity of
actors, power-sharing granted to one group highlights the perceived injustice of political
inequality experienced by other aggrieved ethnic groups. In the context of power-sharing
concessions, the set of potential challengers should only include those groups that are cur-
rently excluded from government power.11 We summarize our argument in two additional
hypotheses:
H3 : Political power-sharing concessions granted post-conflict to an ethnic group in-
crease the risk of civil war onsets by other ethnic groups.
H4 : Political power-sharing concessions granted post-conflict to an ethnic group in-
crease the risk of civil war onsets by other excluded ethnic groups.
We conclude this section by considering three alternative theoretical explanations.
Like our explanation, the first two competing arguments stress a conditional logic that
depends on heterogeneity in the costliness of concessions and the relative capacities of
governments and challengers. First, costlier concessions in terms of the value of territory
or government positions granted to initial challengers might weaken the government and
decrease the likelihood of defeating ethnic groups that would not have had the capacity
to defeat the government prior to the concession. Yet cheaper concessions might raise the
expectations of weaker groups that a even a limited deal with the government is possible.
These countervailing arguments explain whyWalter’s findings on the relationship between
the past and future value of territory and the likelihood of accommodation are mixed
11Influential models of coalition formation that stress rent-seeking may identify the potential chal-
lengers differently. As adding additional groups to the government coalition decreases the resources
available to existing coalition members, already included groups may challenge the government violently
after power-sharing concessions. See Bates (1974) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
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(Walter, 2009b: 128). Nevertheless, variation in the costs of concessions could moderate
reputation effects and we will explore it empirically.
Second, governments also suffer costs from fighting armed conflicts, which could re-
duce their capacity relative to potential challengers (e.g., Bormann & Hammond, 2016:
590-591). Specifically, conflict outcomes could qualify our hypotheses on the effect of vio-
lent versus non-violent challenges (H1,3). Governments that do not win an armed conflict
and then concede a settlement might be particularly vulnerable to violent domino effects.
However, some governments defeat rebel organizations and offer a settlement to the de-
feated group to reduce grievances and the chances of conflict recurrence (see Mukherjee,
2006). This strategy might produce worse reputation effects as such conciliatory govern-
ments prove that fighting pays regardless of its outcome. Since governments frequently
choose to ‘divide and concede’ to self-determination challengers (Cunningham, 2011), we
need to explore this possibility systematically.
Third, unobserved actions of the government and potential challengers between ini-
tial concessions (step 1) and the onset of violent domino effects (step 7) could affect our
conclusions. Governments that grant concessions without fighting (step 2) might trig-
ger multiple additional violent and non-violent demands for concessions (step 5), which
escalate to conflict (step 7) (Walter, 2009b: 27). This theoretical option biases our anal-
ysis against finding support for our first and third hypotheses, which state that only
concessions in response to armed conflict (step 4) trigger violent domino effects (step
7). Additionally, our investigation of power-sharing concessions introduces the possi-
bility that concessions change the government that subsequent challengers face. Newly
included groups that just gained a concession by violence might be much less willing to
share the hard-won spoils with even more groups. Adding a battle-hardened challenger
to the ruling coalition also increases the government’ fighting capacity and makes it more
likely to reject demands by additional groups (step 6). This logic should also deter fu-
ture challengers and thus reduce the likelihood of violent domino effects (step 7). Still,
former enemies now sharing power might also engage in infighting and thus open up the
opportunity for additional rebellions. Once more, we will explore this possibility below.
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Data
In order to test our hypotheses, we rely on the 2014 version of the Ethnic Power Rela-
tions (EPR) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010; Vogt et al., 2015), which includes
politically relevant ethnic groups in the world between 1946 and 2013. Groups become
politically relevant when leaders make political claims on their behalf or when the govern-
ment politically discriminates against them. They can merge into larger umbrella groups
or split into smaller sub-populations.
Following Walter’s focus on ‘armed self-determination challenges’ (2006b: 106), our
outcome variable is the onset of territorial ethnic civil war in a given year, as coded
by the ACD2EPR dataset which links all EPR groups to rebel organizations in the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (ACD) (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012; Gleditsch
et al., 2002; Themnér & Wallensteen, 2014). We code a new onset in years with at least
25 battle-deaths and no active fighting in the government-rebel dyad in the preceding two
years. We only consider civil wars in which ACD rebel groups make an exclusive claim
to fight on behalf of and recruit fighters from an ethnic group.
We also adopt the ACD distinction of territorial and governmental armed conflicts.
Since the repeated play condition implies that multiple groups need to be in a position
to challenge the government, reputation theory should predominantly apply to territorial
civil wars, which are ‘about control of part of the state (who should control it and how).’12
In contrast, governmental civil wars over control of the entire state usually feature one
strong rebel group (Buhaug, 2006) and we expect ethnic groups that initiate governmental
conflicts to be similar in size to the government itself. If governmental power-sharing ends
these more symmetric conflicts, other ethnic groups in the country will likely be too weak
to challenge the government and its new, powerful coalition partner.13
Turning to our explanatory variables, EPR codes the relative size and political access
of all ethnic groups along two dimensions (Vogt et al., 2015: 1331–2). First, it categorizes
groups according to whether they are included or excluded from executive bodies such
12http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/. Accessed on September 23rd, 2016.
13Nevertheless, whether or not reputation theory applies to governmental civil war onsets is an em-
pirical question that we address below.
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as cabinets, royal courts, military juntas, and communist central committees. Second,
EPR provides data on the regional autonomy of territorially concentrated groups, which
covers both ethnic groups that wield substantial control over a federal units as well as
less formal arrangements.14
Although EPR does not directly code peace agreements or constitutional provisions
that protect minorities, its de facto assessment of political power-sharing and territorial
autonomy captures both formal and less formal arrangements (Cederman et al., 2015:
360). Moreover, unlike more detailed data collections that focus on formal concessions
in peace agreements (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008), EPR captures
concessions before and after civil wars, and includes ethnic groups that did not receive
concessions, that is, potential challengers. Finally, data sources on self-determination
movements provide no information on the type of concessions and cover fewer potential
challengers than EPR (see Coggins, 2011; Cunningham, 2011).
Figure 1 summarizes all power-sharing and autonomy concessions in the EPR data.15
It shows that the majority of governments grant concessions to non-violent challengers
(light grey) rather than rebelling ethnic groups (dark grey). Our sample of concessions
to ethnic groups thus reflects findings by Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) that non-violent
movements are more successful in reaching their goals. Furthermore, autonomy conces-
sions become less popular after 1990 while power-sharing concessions become far more
frequent after the end of the Cold War (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007: 54). Out of 296 con-
cessions recorded by the EPR data between 1946 and 2013, only nine cases involve both
autonomy and power-sharing.
Following the conditions of reputation theory (Walter, 2009b: 11–15), we restrict the
EPR sample to those states with more than two ethnic groups, thus excluding cases such
as Rwanda and Burundi where domino effects are impossible. This leaves us with 723
ethnic groups in 120 states. In our sample, governments include between 1 and 14 groups
(mean=2.2), and exclude between 0 and 55 groups (mean=4). We further drop ethnic
groups currently involved in armed conflict and groups that monopolize power in a state
14EPR codes the power structure at the first day of each year, and thus effectively lags all variables.
15We identify concessions by changes in the political status of groups within the previous year.
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Figure 1. Autonomy and Power-Sharing Concessions in EPR
from the analysis.16
We create two indicator variables, one for territorial and one for power-sharing con-
cessions. The autonomy dummy takes the value of 1 when one group witnesses another
group receiving a territorial concession. Equivalently, we code the power-sharing dummy
as 1 when one group witnesses another’s inclusion into the central government. The initial
values decay in subsequent years, so that the signal potential challengers receive weakens
over time. Following Forsberg (2013: 333), we implement a 3-year half-life, which means
that three years after the concession, any observing group will be assigned a value of 0.5
and after another three years a value of 0.25. All years prior to a concession receive a
value of 0, and we reset the decay function once a government grants a new concession.
Arguably, the most recent government behavior should exert the strongest effect on po-
tential challengers’ decision to rebel. To test our first hypothesis, which states that only
post-conflict concessions should trigger domino effects, we compute two half-life functions
for concessions granted before and after armed conflict.
One important threat to inferring the correct relationship between concessions and
16By definition, a group that has monopolized state power cannot fight an ethnic civil war. If several
groups share government power as in Lebanon before 1975, intra-governmental conflicts are of course
possible.
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the likelihood of additional onsets is the possibility of revenge. Where ethnic groups
lose political power after armed conflicts, such as the Whites to the Shona in Zimbabwe
in 1979, they would still witness a ‘concession’ to other groups. Clearly, this is not
comparable to a case where the government includes an additional partner without losing
influence. In contrast, the losing side will be more likely to rebel in reaction to their status
loss. To control for such dynamics, we include a variable that measures whether potential
challengers have been downgraded in the past two years.
Additionally, our models include common control variables from the literature such as
exclusion from government power, existing regional autonomy arrangements, and group
size. Exclusion should increase the risk of new civil wars (Gurr, 2000; Cederman, Wim-
mer & Min, 2010). The effect of regional autonomy remains contested in the literature
with some scholars claiming that it reduces conflict risk (Gurr, 2000; Jarstad & Nilsson,
2008), while others argue that it provides groups with the institutional resources to rebel
(Bunce, 1999). Our group size variable captures the ratio between the potential challenger
and the government.17 As ethnic groups enter into a ruling coalition, for example after a
government grants power-sharing to an initial violent challenger, this variable decreases
for the individual ethnic group, and we thus control for changes in the government com-
position. Civil war onsets should become more likely with increasing group size, which
reflects a higher capacity to challenge the government.
To account for temporal effects, we control for the number of armed conflicts a group
has previously fought against the government. Existing research suggests that this vari-
able captures feelings of revenge and resentment resulting from prior episodes of civil war,
and we thus expect it to increase the likelihood of recurrence (Cederman, Wimmer & Min,
2010: 97). In addition, we employ the cubic polynomial of time since the last conflict
or independence as peace years to account for non-linear temporal dynamics (Carter &
Signorino, 2010).
At the country-level, we employ lagged and logged GDP per capita and population
size variables (Hunziker & Bormann, 2013). In line with existing findings, we expect
17Should the group itself be part of the government, the ratio is calculated with respect to the
remaining government group(s).
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poorer and larger states to face a higher risk of rebellion (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). To
account for the potential cost of concessions, we include the number of ethnic groups in a
state. In light of the poor quality of data on land value (also see Sambanis, Germann &
Schädel, 2018), Walter (2009b: 26) argues that the number of ethnic groups in a country
is ‘a reliable proxy for the amount of land that could come under dispute, and therefore,
the relative value of different pieces of territory to the government.’ She suggests that
more potential challengers make the government more determined to avoid concessions
that could entail additional demands, which in turn implies that groups should recognize
that fighting will not pay. Finally, we control for the number of other armed conflicts a
government fought in the past year to control for decreasing state capacity as an alter-
native explanation of domino effects.18
Analysis
We test our hypotheses by estimating logistic regression models with country-clustered
standard errors. To ensure that the estimated associations between our main explanatory
variables and civil war onsets do not result from high-dimensional correlations with other
variables, we first display a simple base model that only includes the main explanatory
variable but no controls other than peace years (Achen, 2005). This strategy also allows
us to effectively demonstrate how much alternative explanations impact the original effect
of our main explanatory variables.
Territorial concessions and domino effects
We begin by revisiting Forsberg and Walter’s debate. Unlike Walter, we test the effect
of autonomy concessions on the likelihood of additional armed conflict onsets but not on
other less violent tactics. In contrast to Forsberg, we analyze all years between 1946 and
2013 rather than only the post-Cold War period. Additionally, our set of autonomy con-
cessions extends beyond peace agreements by also encompassing territorial arrangements
18Descriptive statistics are available in the online appendix.
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made before the outbreak of hostilities or outside of negotiated settlements. As opposed
to either study, we specifically explore our conditional framework.
Table I presents four models that link autonomy concessions to territorial armed con-
flict onset by potential ethnic challengers. Model 1 includes all concessions in our sample
but excludes all control variables except for peace years. Model 2 adds those controls and
thus provides a specification similar to Walter’s and Forsberg’s tests. Models 3 and 4 test
our conditional arguments as described by H1,2. The estimated effects of all autonomy
concessions in Models 1 and 2 reveals a strongly positive effect on additional civil conflicts
in line with Walter’s original results (Walter, 2009b: 125–132). Although the size of the
effect drops by half, once we add our control variables in Model 2, both estimates are
significantly different from zero.
Model 3 demonstrates that the general effect of all autonomy concessions predomi-
nantly derives from those granted in response to fighting, which provides modest support
for H1 as the average effect dissipates quickly after the concession. Territorial autonomy
granted before armed conflict is unlikely to trigger additional ethnic rebellions.19 Model 4
evaluates H2, which predicts that only non-autonomous and excluded groups are more
likely to rebel after witnessing autonomy granted to another group. The estimated inter-
action coefficient more than doubles relative to the baseline specification in Model 2 and
is estimated with high precision.
To facilitate the substantive interpretation of these results, we simulated the differ-
ence in the likelihood of territorial civil war onset by a potential challenger that witnesses
concessions compared to one that does not. Figure 2 displays the shift in the predicted
probabilities of violent domino effects for excluded groups with and without autonomy
that do not witness a territorial concession to those that do (H2). In the first year after
a concession, the likelihood of additional territorial onsets increases by more than 2.5
percentage points relative to the baseline for groups without any preexisting accommo-
19While the average effect of pre-conflict autonomy in Model 3 is negative, it has a sizable standard
error. Due to this large uncertainty we can only reject the null of no difference between post-conflict
and pre-conflict autonomy concessions in a one-sided test. Like Walter, we are interested in the counter-
factual difference between witnessing and not witnessing concessions and confidently reject the null
hypothesis of no difference.
17
Ethnic Dominoes
Table I. Autonomy concessions (3-year half-life) and territorial ethnic civil war onset,
1946-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Autonomy Concession 2.734∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗
(0.504) (0.247)
Post-Conflict Autonomy Conc. 1.289∗∗ −0.364
(0.452) (0.483)
Pre-Conflict Autonomy Conc. −0.315
(0.804)
Post-Conf. Aut. Conc. × Excl. × ∼ Aut. 3.067∗∗∗
(0.878)
Excluded 1.169∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗∗
(0.296) (0.290) (0.290)
Downgraded 0.943∗ 0.889 0.857
(0.460) (0.459) (0.454)
Autonomy 0.585 0.635∗ 0.827∗∗
(0.303) (0.307) (0.295)
Relative Size −0.280 −0.282 −0.204
(0.623) (0.615) (0.590)
Past Civil Wars 0.592∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.140) (0.141)
Log(# of Groups) −2.268∗∗∗ −2.233∗∗∗ −2.304∗∗∗
(0.458) (0.458) (0.468)
Ongoing Civil War 0.760∗ 0.748∗ 0.734∗
(0.327) (0.333) (0.336)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.213 −0.231∗ −0.215
(0.111) (0.107) (0.115)
Log(Population) 0.332∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗ 0.348∗∗
(0.095) (0.104) (0.113)
Peace Years −0.269∗∗∗ −0.312∗∗∗ −0.319∗∗∗ −0.324∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.057) (0.056) (0.058)
Peace Years2 0.008∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Peace Years3 −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −3.465∗∗∗ −6.830∗∗∗ −6.796∗∗∗ −7.035∗∗∗
(0.243) (1.746) (1.858) (2.006)
N 29,653 27,011 27,011 27,011
` −827.716 −611.069 −611.574 −607.428
AIC 1,665.432 1,250.138 1,253.148 1,244.855
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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dation.20 The negative reputation effect of granting autonomy concessions diminishes as
the time to the concession increases and reaches almost zero after ten years. The effect
is non-existent for groups that already enjoy either territorial autonomy or inclusion.21
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Figure 2. Differences in territorial onset probability between witnessing and not witness-
ing post-conflict autonomy concessions for excluded groups by autonomy status
Before turning to domino effects after power-sharing concessions, we briefly discuss
the estimated effects of our control variables. Exclusion from government power, a history
of past conflict, ongoing civil wars in the territory of the state, and a higher population
increase the likelihood of new onsets. As predicted by Walter, countries with a higher
number of potential challengers experience a lower risk of additional civil wars in Models 2
through 4. Our estimates of the downgraded and the GDP per capita variables point to
the expected directions but remain statistically insignificant at the .05-level in two of
three models.
Two estimated effects do not align with previous findings. For one, we consistently
find a negative and statistically insignificant estimate of group size, which may derive
from our focus on territorial civil wars that involve smaller challengers. For another,
regional autonomy makes ethnic groups more likely to rebel rather than less. This finding
20We show the median predicted probability of one additional territorial onset along with the 5th and
95th percentiles out of 2,000 simulated draws from a multivariate normal distribution defined by our
estimated coefficients from Model 4, and the control variables set to their mean or median values.
21Our appendix contains graphical interpretations of both H1 and H2. See Figures A2 and A3.
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either reflects the double-edged sword of territorial power-sharing that not only assuages
grievances but also provides the organizational resources to stage a rebellion (Roeder,
1991; Bunce, 1999), or the potential endogeneity of autonomy to conflict risk (Grigoryan,
2012).
Political power-sharing concessions and domino effects
Proceeding in the same order as above, Model 5 in Table II shows that governments
that grant political power-sharing increase the risk of violent domino effects. Model 6
adds control variables which slightly reduce the estimated effect size of power-sharing
concessions while increasing the estimated standard error. Yet we continue to find a
positive and statistically significant effect of power-sharing concessions on the likelihood
of additional civil war onsets by potential challengers.
Model 7 tests H3 by distinguishing between power-sharing concessions granted to
non-violent challengers and those granted to violent challengers. Whereas our estimate
of post-conflict concessions continues to exert a strongly positive effect on additional ter-
ritorial onsets, concessions granted before the outbreak of hostilities have no meaningful
impact on potential challengers’ likelihood to rebel. A two-sided t-test reveals statistically
significant differences between concessions granted before and after the outbreak of armed
conflict at the .1 level. In Model 8, we narrow our focus to post-conflict power-sharing
concessions and, in accordance with H4, find that only excluded groups are associated
with a higher risk of subsequent rebellion. In contrast, included groups exhibit a nega-
tive and highly uncertain propensity to rebel when witnessing power-sharing concessions.
A two-sided t-test demonstrates statistically significant differences between concessions
granted to included and excluded potential challengers at the .1 level.
As before, we present substantive effects for witnessing post-conflict concessions and
vary the political status of the potential challenger from political exclusion to inclusion in
Figure 3 (H4). In the first year after a concession, the probability of additional territorial
civil wars for excluded groups increases by almost two percentage points and then de-
clines. In contrast, included groups witnessing post-conflict power-sharing experience no
20
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Table II. Political power-sharing (3-year half-life) and territorial ethnic civil war onset,
1946-2013
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Power-Sharing Concession 1.850∗∗ 1.631∗
(0.661) (0.767)
PS Post-Conflict Conc. 1.987∗∗∗ −1.418
(0.569) (1.653)
PS Pre-Conflict Conc. −0.249
(0.972)
PS Post-Conflict Conc. × Excl. 4.099∗
(1.817)
Excluded 1.185∗∗∗ 1.244∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗
(0.295) (0.305) (0.315)
Downgraded 0.826 0.831 0.770
(0.473) (0.480) (0.483)
Autonomy 0.664∗ 0.670∗ 0.712∗
(0.295) (0.290) (0.301)
Relative Size −0.306 −0.269 −0.352
(0.636) (0.645) (0.675)
Past Civil Wars 0.590∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.140) (0.138)
Log(# of Groups) −2.198∗∗∗ −2.172∗∗∗ −2.224∗∗∗
(0.486) (0.481) (0.480)
Ongoing Civil War 0.824∗ 0.823∗ 0.816∗
(0.346) (0.354) (0.347)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.210 −0.203 −0.190
(0.121) (0.118) (0.117)
Log(Population) 0.351∗∗ 0.354∗∗ 0.356∗∗
(0.113) (0.115) (0.110)
Peace Years −0.243∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗ −0.312∗∗∗ −0.306∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056)
Peace Years2 0.007∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Peace Years3 −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −3.480∗∗∗ −7.253∗∗∗ −7.432∗∗∗ −7.332∗∗∗
(0.247) (2.004) (2.053) (2.046)
N 29,653 27,011 27,011 27,011
` −839.469 −612.166 −610.741 −608.624
AIC 1,688.938 1,252.331 1,251.482 1,247.248
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 3. Differences in onset probability between witnessing and not witnessing post-
conflict power-sharing concessions for excluded (left) and included groups (right)
higher risk of conflict onset relative to the baseline of no concessions. Compared to the
substantive effect of H3, taking into account both concession type and challenger status
increases the precision and duration of the perverse effect of power-sharing concessions
(see Figure A4).22 Overall, these results allow us to reject the null hypothesis of no
domino effects associated with political power-sharing concessions under the conditions
described by H4.
Comparing the effects of autonomy and power-sharing conditions, we find that their
magnitudes do not differ much once we condition on political status (Models 4 and 8).
However, the predicted probability of additional armed conflicts by any group after post-
conflict power-sharing exceeds the one after granting autonomy by almost an order of
magnitude (Models 3 and 7). This difference partially explains the contradictory findings
by Walter and Forsberg. As Forsberg does not consider conditional effects, her analysis
misses the strong interactive effect of exclusion and witnessing concessions. In contrast,
Walter’s analysis builds on Gurr’s Minorities at Risk data that disproportionately samples
‘at risk’ groups (Hug, 2013), which suggests parallels between the conditional effects
suggested by our argument and Walter’s focus on essentially excluded groups. In sum,
the results presented above support a conditional interpretation of reputation theory for
22We find no difference between excluded groups that witness concessions to non-violent challengers
relative to those that witness no concessions.
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both autonomy and power-sharing concessions.
Robustness checks
To probe the robustness of our results, we estimated a number of alternative model
specifications presented in the online appendix. To rule out that either autonomy or
power-sharing concessions pick up the effect of the other, we added both triggers to
our main conditional models. While we find some increased uncertainty, the results
continue to be both statistically and substantively significant for both power-sharing and
autonomy concessions (Table A2). We also reject explanations that predict an increased
risk of internal conflicts over government power after concessions, due to rebellions by
disaffected outsiders or infighting (Tables A3 & A4). According to our data, domino
effects only apply to territorial or secessionist armed conflict.
As Figure 1 reveals different patterns of concessions during and after the Cold War, we
probed whether domino effects vary by time period. Indeed we find that domino effects
associated with power-sharing exclusively occur after 1990 (Table A2 & Figure A5). This
result fits Tull and Mehler’s (2005) description of the perverse repercussions of power-
sharing concessions in Sub-Saharan Africa in response to the international community’s
turn towards power-sharing as a means of conflict resolution in the early 1990s. During
the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union variably supported many narrow-
based regimes and relieved them from forming inclusive government coalitions to overcome
domestic threats (Boix & Svolik, 2013: 308; Cheibub & Hays, 2017). Therefore, ethnic
minority regimes were more common during the Cold War and governments did not
need to extend political power-sharing concessions to stabilize their rule. In contrast,
territorial concessions were much higher during the Cold War and the data show that
domino effects associated with autonomy concessions were relevant mostly before 1990
(Table A2 & Figure A6). These period effects further explain the null results found
by Forsberg, who analyzes the period between 1989 and 2004. They also underline the
importance of international actors for studying armed conflict in general (Kalyvas &
Balcells, 2010) and secession in particular (Coggins, 2011).
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We also explore the effect of two other conditions on violent domino effects: concession
costliness and government capacity. Using the size of the receiving group as a proxy for
concession costs, we find that larger territorial concessions only have a higher likelihood
of triggering domino effects in the first year after a concession (Figure A7) and no sig-
nificant effect for power-sharing concessions. Similarly, conflict outcomes, our proxy for
variation in government capacity and coded on the basis of the link between the UCDP
termination data by Kreutz (2010) and the non-state actor (NSA) dataset by Cunning-
ham, Gleditsch & Salehyan (2009), do not change our theoretical conclusions but provide
interesting additional insights (Tables A7 and A8). Rebel victory consistently reduces
the likelihood of domino effects and even perfectly predicts no conflict when combined
with post-conflict autonomy concessions. Stalemates in the form of either negotiated set-
tlements or ceasefires slightly increase the risk of additional challenges but do not reach
statistically significant results. Although our estimate of government victory indicates
that it deters additional armed conflicts by other ethnic groups, it fails to reach statisti-
cal significance in almost all specifications. Yet, when we interact post-conflict autonomy
concessions and government victory, we find that this strategy of ‘defeat and concede’
has a strong positive effect on additional armed conflict onsets.
Additional robustness checks include alternative half-life specifications (Tables A9-
A12), hierarchical models with random intercepts at the country and year-level (Ta-
bles A13 & A14), and linear probability models with group-fixed effects (Table A15).
Our results remain robust throughout the vast majority of these specifications. Only the
hierarchical framework reveals slightly greater uncertainty for domino effects after both
territorial and power-sharing concessions, and hence slightly diminishes our confidence in
H2 and H3. As the most conservative group-level fixed effects models show support for
all our hypotheses, we remain confident that our results present reliable estimates.
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Conclusion
Preventing civil wars remains a tremendous challenge for war-prone countries. One os-
tensibly straightforward strategy governments can adopt is to appease opposition by
extending concessions. However, Walter argues that forward-looking governments of
multi-ethnic societies have an incentive to avoid extending territorial concessions to early
challengers to signal resolve and thus reduce the risk of future violent challenges. Building
on Walter’s reputation theory, we outline the conditions under which territorial conces-
sions should be more likely to generate violent domino effects. First, only concessions
granted in response to violent challenges should inspire future rebellion. Second, only
those groups with existing grievances against the government would have incentives to
rebel in reaction to the accommodation of the demands of another ethnic group.
Our conditional argument also uncovers a similar dynamic for non-territorial con-
cessions. Power-sharing concessions trigger additional conflicts only if they are granted
after wars and only by excluded groups. Put differently, neither territorial nor power-
sharing concessions incite additional territorial armed conflicts if governments grant them
to non-violent challengers and if other ethnic groups’ grievances are addressed through
pre-existing autonomy or power-sharing.
Our findings have several important policy implications. For one, promoters of power-
sharing institutions as a conflict resolution tool need to be aware of the potential perverse
consequences of political power-sharing when it does not extend to all groups in a country.
This calls for an encompassing approach to creating post-war peace arrangements as
advocated by Lijphart (1977) rather than partial power-sharing institutions that do not
include all politically relevant ethnic groups. If only partial peace is possible (Nilsson,
2008), the international community should not only monitor former conflict actors and
regions but also potential challengers in the same state — particularly in the initial two
to three years after concessions, when the risk of domino effects peaks.
Additionally, granting autonomy or sharing political power before civil war breaks out
does not seem to trigger violent domino effects but may still motivate additional demands
for self-determination. In order to avoid the detrimental humanitarian consequences of
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internal armed conflicts, the international community should continue to push ethnically
exclusive regimes to share power during nonviolent times. As many theories of ethnic
politics predict that political elites will be loathe to sharing power (Bates, 1974; Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2003), conflict researchers should dedicate more attention towards iden-
tifying openings for more inclusive and accommodating regimes before civil war breaks
out (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Cunningham, 2013b). This task is all the more ur-
gent because fighting civil wars itself increases the risk of violent demonstration effects
(Bormann & Hammond, 2016). Governments engaged in an ongoing rebellion thus face a
Catch-22 when deciding whether to continue confronting or to concede to one challenger.
Granting concessions may still present the lesser of two evils.
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